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ANOTHER In Bonner v. Moran' the defendant surgeon, after
procuring the consent of the infant plaintiff who was fifteen years of
age, proceeded with a skin graft operation which was intended to aid a
near relative of the plaintiff but was to be of no beneficial consequence
to himself. The minor's parent had not been apprised of the fact that
the plaintiff was submitting himself to the operation, nor was any
attempt made to communicate with her. Upon learning of the operation,
the parent, as next friend, brought action against the surgeon for assault
and battery. The trial judge instructed the jury that if they believed
that the minor was capable of appreciating and did appreciate the
nature and consequences of the operation and actually or impliedly
consented thereto, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The jury
so found. On appeal, it was held that, notwithstanding the fact that
the infant was capable of appreciating the nature and consequences of
such an operation, the consent of the minor could not insulate the doctor
from liability.
It is elementary law that an unpermitted touching of another's per-
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son constitutes an assault and battery, 2 hence the performance of a
surgical operation without the consent of the patient, or of someone
legally competent to give consent for him, exposes the surgeon to civil
liability for an assault and battery.3 Conversely, if the patient has consented to the surgery that is performed upon his person, the surgeon
is free from civil liability because he who consents cannot receive an
4
injury.
The general rule of law with reference to minors is, however, that
the consent of the parent is necessary before a surgical operation may
be performed upon the minor if the surgeon is to be relieved of civil
liability. 5 This rule, of course, is subject to exceptions, as where the
infant is in dire need of an operation designed to benefit his life or
health and his consent cannot be obtained, nor can the consent of the
parent or guardian be obtained because they are too distantly removed
from the place of the operation that the attendant delay might further
endanger the life of the infant. 6 Logically, another exception should
appear where emancipation of the infant has removed the disabilities
attendant upon his minority, 7 as where the minor has married; 8 or has
entered the armed services; or has been declared so emancipated by
judicial proceedings. 9
In addition, at least one jurisdiction has held that, where the minor
is close to maturity, the surgeon may be justified in accepting his
consent.' 0 Thus in Bishop v. Shurly," where the infant was nineteen
years of age, the court recognized that he could give a valid consent
to a surgical operation upon his person. The cpurt reasoned that the
consent was valid in that the operation, being necessary, it fell into the
category of "necessaries" for which the infant could become bound.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts also propounds the theory that:
"if a child. . .though under guardianship, is capable of appreciating
the nature, extent and consequences of the invasion, his assent prevents the invasion from creating liability, though the assent of the par3 Blackstone Comm. 120; 6 C. J. S., Assault and Battery, 796 § 1.
Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill.
App. 161 (1905), affirmed in 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562,
7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609 (1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12, 1 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 439 (1905); Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 P. 683 (1924); Throne
v. Wandell, 176 Wis. 97, 186 N.W. 146 (1922); Meek v. Loveland, 85 Col. 346, 276
P. 30 (1929).
4 Restatement of the Law of Torts § 53; Cooley on Torts, I, § 97.
5 In re Vasko, 263 N. Y. S.552 (1933); Zosky v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N. W.
99 (1935); Moss v. Rishworth, Tex. Com. App., 222 S.W. 225 (1920); Browning
v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
6 Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Ia. 914, 237 N.W. 444, 76 A. L. R. 551 (1931); Luka
v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
7 31 C. J. 1008 § 37.
8 Grayson v. Lofland, 21 Tex. Civ. A. 503, 52 S.W. 121 (1899).
9 Mark v. McElroy, 67 Miss. 545, 7 So. 408 (1890).
10 Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 612 (1906).
11 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926).
2
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ent, guardian or other person is not obtained, or is expressly refused."' 2
These doctrines were, however, expressly repudiated in the instant case.
The Bakker case, and the view expounded by the Restatement of the
Law of Torts, proceed on the theory that an infant close to maturity
and old enough to appreciate the imminence of danger in a surgical
operation, should be able to give a valid consent. The problem for them,
then, becomes one of factual determination. The court in the instant
case, however, expresses the view that the age at which an infant
attains such maturity as to appreciate the danger and consequences of
an invasion of his person, is that age which is recognized by any
given jurisdiction as being the time when the infant attains his majority.
Prior thereto, ability to appreciate consequences does not exist. Moreover these views are distinguishable in that the former proceeds on the
theory of benefit to the infant, whereas in the instant case no such
benefit was present. No element of "necessity" can be found in subjecting a minor to an operation designed to aid another. It would
therefore seem wiser to deny to an infant, though close to maturity, any
opportunity for self-sacrifice which could result in ill effects without
any chance of benefit to himself.
F. J. PAUSE
EMINENT DOMAIN-TAXATION OF PROPERTY IN PROCESS OF CONDEMNATIONLiABILIrY FOR TAXES ACCRUING AFTER PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BUT BEFORE
FINAL JUDGMENT--In 1926 the City of Chicago instituted proceedings un-

der the Local Improvement Act' to condemn certain property needed
for the widening of a public street. The duly appointed commissioners, on
May 26, 1926, filed their report as to the amount of just compensation
for the property to be taken, but final judgment was not entered until
June 30, 1929. In the meantime, general taxes for the years 1927, 1928,
and 1929 were levied against the property but were not paid. In 1936 the
amount of the condemnation judgment was deposited with the County
Treasurer who insisted upon retaining the amount of these unpaid taxes
from the fund before remitting to the property owner. Proceedings were
thereafter instituted to compel the County Treasurer to pay over the
amount retained. Judgment for the defendant on the ground that he
possessed a deductible lien for such unpaid taxes was reversed by the
Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. McCausland.2
The problem herein involved arises because, while the amount of
compensation to be paid for the property is fixed as of the date of the
filing of the commissioners' report, or of the petition filed in the proceedings,3 the title does not pass to the condemning authority until the
12 § 59, comment A.
1 Cahill Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 24, § 135, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 84-13.
2 379 Ill. 602, 41 N.E. (2d) 745 (1942), reversing 308 Ill. App. 538, 32 N.E. (2d)

336 (1941) transferred by 374 Ill. 34, 27 N.E. (2d) 824 (1940).
3 The amount of compensation to be awarded under the Local Improvement
Act is fixed as of the date of filing the report of the commissioners: City of Chi-
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compensation is actually paid. 4 In many cases a considerable time may
elapse between these two dates. The owner of the property is, in the
meantime, entitled to the possession of the property until he has been
paid, 5 and, since 1933, no interest on the judgment or award is allowed
until the condemnor takes possession of or damages the property. 6 However, when these acts are completed the title is said to relate back to the
date on which compensation was fixed, so that liens acquired after that
date should not be charges on the property itself. Decisions prior to the
instant case have presented the question of whether or not the subsequent lien holder was to be paid for his rights by the condemning authority,7 but in those cases the Illinois Supreme Court has used broad language which would seem to establish the rule that the title acquired
through the condemnation proceedings relates back for all purposes to
the date on which compensation was fixed.8 There is nothing, however, to
require that condemnation proceedings, once instituted, may not be
abandoned, 9 in which case subsequent liens should be reinstated. Taxing
authorities under the circumstances would scarcely be justified in failing
to assess taxes on the property during the interim period until title was
actually transferred.' 0
The decision in the instant case holds that, since the title acquired
relates back to the time when the commissioners made their report, "...
only the liens that existed at that time . . .are liens against the fund.""
Inasmuch as the Illinois Constitution requires that no property shall be
taken without just compensation therefor, 12 it naturally follows that to
permit taxes for subsequent years to be charged as a lien against the
cago v. Farwell, 286 Ill.
415, 121 N.E. 795 (1918). The corresponding date under
the Eminent Domain Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 47, is the date of filing the petition for condemnation: City of Chicago v. Collin, 302 Ill. 270, 134 N.E. 751 (1922)
and cases there cited.
4 Van Winkle v. Loehde, 336 Ill. 327, 168 N.E. 319 (1929).
5 People ex rel. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., v. City of Chicago, 368 Ill. 421, 14 N.E.
(2d) 473 (1938).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 84-32, substantially re-enacting Ill. Rev. Stat.
1933, Ch. 24, § 731.
7 See Chicago, Evanston and Lake Superior Railroad Co. v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 119 Ill. 525, 10 N.E. 372 (1887), and dicta in Mills v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 345 Ill. 503, 178 N.E. 126 (1931).
s Compare the issues involved with the language in Hutchins v. Vandalia Levee
and Drainage District, 217 Ill.
561, 75 N.E. 354 (1905).
9 The new Cities and Villages Act provides that the municipality shall have an
election to enter judgment on the verdict or abandon the proceedings, but, once
entered, the judgment is unconditional. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 84-32.
10 Although no assessment of real property shall be considered as illegal by
reason of the same not being listed or assessed in the name of the owner or
owners thereof by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 511, condemned property
would be eligible for tax exemption under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 500.
Prior to actual acquisition of such property, however, it does not appear that
any basis for tax exemption exists.
11 379 Ill. 602 at 606, 41 N.E. (2d) 745 at 748.
12 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
award for just compensation would infringe upon the constitutional
rights of the property owner by giving him less than is his due.
In this respect, no fault can be found with the decision, but it does
not determine the broader question of whether the former owner or the
condemnor is to be held personally liable for subsequent taxes until the
property becomes actually exempt. There is language in the case which
would seem to indicate that the court feels that this tax burden should
fall on the condemnor. It points out that the right of the tax collector to
a personal judgment against one sued as the owner of real estate "...
is not absolute, but the defendant is entitled to personal service of
process and may in such suit make certain defenses that would defeat
the judgment."' 3 Certainly in a suit at law brought against one for nonpayment of taxes on real estate, his answer could disclose that he was
not the owner of the property at the time the tax was imposed, if the
passage of his title is presumed to have occurred on the date on which the
value thereof, for condemnation purposes, was fixed. From that time on,
he, in theory at least, ceases being an owner and hence no longer subject
to taxation. It would, then, seem to follow that the personal obligation
to pay the taxes accruing in the interim period should fall on the condemning authority, who, as owner of the property, ought to pay the
same until exemption from taxation has been secured.
In the case of People ex rel. Stuckart v. Price,'14 however, sixtyeight feet of a seventy-one foot lot were condemned. The proceedings
were started in 1911 but final judgment was not entered until May 2, 1917.
The property owner paid taxes for 1910 to 1915, but refused to pay taxes
for 1916 on the part of the lot taken because, by then, most of his tenants
had moved by reason of the condemnation proceedings. The tax collector
sought an order to sell the property for the unpaid taxes on the entire
lot, which had become a lien on May 1, 1916. The court there pointed out
that, even though under the circumstances, the result might not be absolutely equitable, the title had remained in the taxpayer until after the
taxes had become a lien and he was, therefore, required to pay them.1 5
The instant decision cannot be said to overrule the Price case but it
has cast some doubt upon its validity. In the ordinary sale of real property, the vendor has the obligation to pay taxes levied while he still holds
title in the absence of express provision in the contract, or unless the
vendee is enjoying the possession of the premises. 16 Since, in the ordi379 Ill.
602 at 606, 41 N.E. (2d) 745 at 748.
282. Ill. 519, 118 N.E. 759 (1918).
15 The Price case is distinguished from the present case on the ground that the
issues presented are not the same. This distinction has been made previously in
City of Chicago v. McDonough, 273 Ill. App. 392 (1934). On the other hand, in
People ex rel. Carofiglio v. Gill, 291 Ill. App. 143, 9 N.E. (2d) 581 (1937), the Price
case was held to be authority for permitting the County Treasurer to retain taxes
which accrued after the filing of the petition for condemnation. In the light of
the McCausland case, the latter decision can no longer be considered good
authority.
16 Glancy v. Elliott, 14 Ill. 455 (1853), and Coombs v. People, 198 Ill.
586, 64 N.E.
1056 (1902).
13
14

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

nary condemnation proceeding, the owner is left in possession and is
permitted to collect the income from the property until payment of the
award is made, it would seem more fair to impose the liability for taxes
accruing during the interim on him. Final determination of that problem must, however, await solution, though the instant case may foreshadow a result which would permit the owner to retain the benefits of
occupancy without being charged with the usual attendant burdens,
R. C. BARTLETT
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1938, MAY DELEGATE THE POWER TO SIGN AND ISSUE A SUBPOENA
DUCES TECUM - By its decision in the recent case of Cudahy Packing
Company of Louisiana v. Holland,' the Supreme Court of the United
States has settled a question concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act
which has bothered courts and lawyers since the date of its enactment.
That question is whether or not the Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor has the power to delegate to
regional directors, or other officials of the department, the authority to
sign and issue subpoenas to compel the production of designated evidence. In that case, an application was made to the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana for an order on the company to show
cause why it should not be compelled to obey a subpoena duces tecum
issued by a regional director of the Wage and Hour Division which
commanded the production of certain books and papers. The respondent
moved to dismiss the proceedings, but the motion was denied and production of the demanded books was ordered. On appeal, the order was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on petition which
presented, as a ground for reversal, the want of authority in the regional
director to issue the subpoena. This challenge of the authority required
the court to construe Section 4(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
which provides: "The principal office of the Administrator shall be in
the District of Columbia, but he or his duly authorized representative
2
may exercise any and all of his powers in any place."
The same question had arisen in an earlier case in the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, which court, seemingly without
hesitation, interpreted the section as allowing the delegation of the
power. The court there said: "The Congress in allowing such a delegation, without question, relied upon the fact that the authority to delegate powers by the Administrator would be exercised in no unreasonable manner. . .All this seems reasonable. Congress evidently did not
intend that the Administrator would perform all the duties that were
OF

1 - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 651, 86 L. Ed. 654 (1942), reversing 119 F. (2d) 209 (1941).
2 29 U.S.C.A. § 204(c).
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required by the Act, and the language of Section 4(c) gives ample
authority to permit the Administrator to delegate to an Acting Regional Director authority to sign such a subpoena. . .."3 The question was
also presented in Fleming v. Arsenal Building Corporation,4 in which
case the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania likewise
came to the conclusion that the Administrator did have the authority
to delegate the subpoena power. In fact that court considered the question so well settled that it was content to overrule the objection and
cite the language of the section as authority. A like result was also
reached in a subsequent case.5
Thus the matter stood until the decision of the United States
Supreme Court, now under consideration, was handed down. The question was, thereby, answered in the negative though the court was divided
five to four. A dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas in
which Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Byrnes and Mr. Justice Jackson
concurred. The dissenting opinion proceeded upon the ground that because of the vast scope of the Act it was a practical necessity that the
Administrator have the authority to delegate this subpoena power. The
dissenting opinion stated: "So far as the subpoena power is concerned, it
would seem that the Administrator has satisfied all statutory demands
in this situation by his selection of the limited group which can issue
subpoenas, by formulating the policy to guide them, and by ratifying a
subpoena issued by his subordinate." 6
No doubt a great burden is placed upon the Administrator when he
is forbidden to delegate the task of issuing the many subpoenas which
must, in the course of ordinary investigations, issue from the department. But the language of the statute, when viewed in the light of
other and prior enactments of the same or of a similar nature, leads to
agreement with the statement made in the majority opinion that: "The
entire history of the legislation controlling the use of subpoenas by
administrative officers indicates a Congressional purpose not to authorize by implication the delegation of the subpoena power." 7 Behind this
statement lies the consideration of a number of acts wherein the subpoena power has been dealt with. In each act it is found that the power
to delegate the subpoena power has either been withheld, expressly
granted, or restrictively granted.
A more or less typical provision that has been construed as withholding the power to delegate the authority to issue subpoenas is found
in the Interstate Commerce Act where the grant of the power is to the
Interstate Commerce Commission alone in the following language: "...
and for the purposes of this chapter the commission shall have power
to require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
3
4
5
6
7

Fleming v. Lowell Sun Company, 36 F. Supp. 320 at 326 (1940).
38 F. Supp. 675 (1940).
Fleming v. Easton Publishing Co., 38 F. Supp. 677 (1941).
-U. S. -, at -, 62 S. Ct. 651, at 658, 86 L. Ed. 654, at 661.
-U. S. - at -, 62 S. Ct. 651 at 655, 86 L. Ed. 654 at 658.
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the production of all books, papers. . . ."s In a subsequent sub-section
there is some similarity to the provisions of Section 4(c) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act where it is stated that: "Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evidence, may be required from any place in the United States, at any designated place of
hearing." 9 Other examples of acts which have been construed to withhold
the power to delegate the authority to issue subpoenas are the Bituminous Coal Act, 10 and the National Labor Relations Act," both of which
do not expressly provide for a delegation of the power yet contain
clauses permitting acts to be done from places other than the main
offices of the agencies.
The acts which permit the delegation have used language such as is
found in the Railroad Unemployment Act, to-wit: "(a). . .the Board
shall have the power to issue subpenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence, documentary
or otherwise, that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. . . (m) The Board is authorized to delegate to any member, officer,
or employee of the Board any of the powers conferred upon the Board
by this chapter, excluding only the power to prescribe rules and regulations." 12 Like provisions, varying in manner of phrasing, are found in
14
13
the Veterans' Administration Act, the Federal Power Act, the Walsh16
15
the SecuriHealey Public Contracts Act, the Merchant Marine Act,
8 49 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1).
9 49 U.S.C.A. § 12 (2).
10 15 U.S.C.A. § 49. See also Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 15 U.S.C.A. § 838:
.. for the purpose of conducting its investigations, said Commission shall have
full power to issue subpenas and subpenas duces tecum ......
11 29 U.S.C.A. § 161 (1): "Any members of the Board shall have power to issue
subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation... Such attendance
of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place
in the United States ......
12 45 U.S.C.A. § 362 (a) and (m).
'3 38 U.S.C.A. § 131: "For the purposes of the laws administered by the Veterans' Administration, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, and those employees
to whom the Administrator may delegate such authority, to the extent of the
authority so delegated, shall have the power to issue subpenas for and compel the
attendance of witnesses within a radius of one hundred miles from the place of
hearing, to require the production of books ... "
14 16 U.S.C.A. § 825f (b): "For the purpose of any investigation or any other
proceeding under this chapter, any member of the Commission, or any officer

designated by it is empowered to . . . subpena witnesses . . . and require the

production of any books, papers . ..Such attendance of witnesses and the production of any such record may be required from any place in the United States
at any designated place of hearing."
15 41 U.S.C.A. § 39: ". . . Secretary of Labor, or an impartial representative
designated by him, shall have the power to hold hearings and to issue orders
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence under oath."
16 46 U.S.C.A. § 1124 (a): "For the purpose of any investigation which, in the
opinion of the Commission, is necessary and proper in carrying out the provi-
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ties Act of 1933,17 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,18 and the Public
Utility Holding Company Act. 19
The third type of statute, wherein the power to delegate is restrictively granted is exemplified by the Communications Act, 20 the Bureau
of Marine Inspection and Navigation Act, 21 the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938,22 the Motor Carrier Act, 23 and the Longshoreman's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. 24 The typical provision is found in Section
409(a) of the Communications Act wherein it is provided that: "Any
member or examiner of the Commission, or the director of any division, when duly designated by the Commission for such purpose, may...
-25
sign and issue subpenas ....
From these examples it is apparent that Congress has been cognizant of the problem, and, in those instances where it was deemed necessary and proper, has given the authority to delegate the subpoena
sions of this chapter, any member of the Commission, or any officer or employee
thereof designated by it, is empowered to subpena witnesses . . . and require
the production of any books, papers, or other documents . . . Such attendance
of witnesses and the production . . . may be required from any place in the
United States or any Territory, district, or possession thereof at any designated
place of hearing."
17 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b): "...
any member of the Commission or any officer
or officers designated by it are empowered to . . . subpena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books . . . Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such documentary evidence may be required from
any place in the United States or any Territory at any designated place of
hearing."
18 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(b):

"...

any member of the Commission or any officer

designated by it is empowered to .

.

. subpena witnesses, compel their attendance

. . . and require the production of any books . . . Such attendance of witnesses

and the production of any such records may be required from any place in the
United States or any State at any designated place of hearing."
19 15 U.S.C.A. § 79r(c): ". . . any member of the Commission, or any officer
thereof designated by it, is empowered to . . . subpena witnesses . . . and require
the production of any books, papers . . . Such attendance . . . may be required
from any place in any State or in any Territory or other place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States at any designated place of hearing."
20 47 U.S.C.A. § 409 (a): "Any member or examiner of the Commission, or the
director of any division, when duly designated by the Commission for such purpose, may . . . sign and issue subpenas. ..
"
21 46 U.S.C.A. § 239 (e): "In any investigation directed by this section a marine
casualty investigation board or a marine board shall have power to summon before it witnesses and to require the production of books, papers, documents, and
any other evidence."
22 49 U.S.C.A. § 644 (a): "Any member or examiner of the Board, when duly
designated by the Board for such purpose, may hold hearings, sign and issue
subpenas. .. ."
23 49 U.S.C.A. § 305 (d): ...
the Commission and the members and examiners
thereof and joint boards shall have the same power to administer oaths, and require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
of books. ....
.
24 33 U.S.C.A. § 927 (a): "The deputy commissioner shall have power to preserve and enforce order during any such proceedings; to issue subpoenas ..
25 47 U.S.C.A. § 409 (a).
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power. By examination of the acts set out above there appears to be a
sound basis for the statement of the court in the principal case that:
"The entire history of the legislation controlling the use of subpoenas by
administrative officers indicates a Congressional purpose not to author' 26
ize by implication the delegation of the subpoena power.
J.

H. SMITH

MUNICnAL CORPORATIONS-USE AND REGULATION OF PUBLIC STREETs-VALmITY
TRACK TO PRIVATE PLANT To BE LAID
IN A PUBLIC STREET-In Greenlee Foundry Co. v. Borin Art Products CorOF ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING SWITcH

poration,' the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
a town ordinance permitting a switch track to be laid in a public street
between a railroad right of way and a private plant was void as allowing
an unwarranted use of the street for a private purpose, and also to consider the further point whether or not such track, when laid, amounted
to a purpresture which could be enjoined upon petition of an abutting
owner who did not own the fee to that half of the street upon which the
track was laid. The case was the culmination of three attempts by the
defendants, and their predecessors in interest, to lay a switch track down
a street in Cicero between the Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal
Company right of way and their own property, a distance of one city
block. Each of these attempts produced litigation and in each case the
decision was against the right to lay the track.
The first attempt was made in 1923 when Limits Industrial Railroad
Company (later found to be no more than a private corporation), in reliance upon a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Illinois Commerce Commission and upon a town ordinance, 2 sought to condemn a short strip for this track across the corner of private property
with the intention of then having the track continue down the center of
the street to the property in question which is now owned by the present
defendants. Upon appeal, the court found that the company was not a
public utility and, consequently, the certificate was of no effect and the
petition was dismissed.8 The second attempt was made shortly after
such adverse ruling. This time, the railroad company did, in fact, lay
U. S. - at p. -, 62 S. Ct. 651 at 655, 86 L. Ed. 654 at 658.
1 379 Ill.
494, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 (1942). Farthing, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
inwhich Murphy, C. J., concurred.
2 379 Ill.
494 at 495, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 at 533.
3 Limits Industrial Railroad Co. v. American Spiral Pipe Works, 321 Ill.
101,
151 N.E. 567 (1926). The Court found that the railroad had, for its secretary and
general manager, the real estate operator who owned the option on the tract to
be served. President of the company was the track-laying contractor, who had
no office and could not be located at the time of trial. One director was a night
watchman in a garage, while another was a salesman employed by the real
estate operator. The sole assets of the company were the ordinance, the certificate,
its capital stock, and a lease which one of its directors had given it.
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the track down the center of the street.4 Thereupon one of the two owners, whose lands abut on opposite sides of the block, filed a suit in ejectment upon the theory that the fee to the street had remained in him; that
the town had an easement only for street purposes; and that the track
was an unwarranted servitude upon his fee title. The court so held and
order of ouster was issued. 5
About ten years later, the certificate and the ordinance were amended
to provide for locating the track wholly down the south side of the
street and the rights therein were assigned to the present defendants. 6
The owner of the abutting premises along the south side of the street also
granted to the defendants a perpetual easement to lay and maintain
tracks in this latest location. In contrast with former plans, this track
was not, at any point, to touch or cross the north half of the street, being
the half which the instant plaintiff owns in fee. After work had begun
and a portion of the track had been laid, a complaint seeking an injunction was filed predicated on the theory that the town ordinance was
void as it devoted a public street to a private use and upon the further
ground that the track was a purpresture. At the hearing, the facts disclosed that the district involved in this litigation was entirely industrial. 7 Traffic bound for plaintiff's plant is the only traffic which has
occasion to use this particular block.8 In addition to leaving one-half of
the street wholly free, the track was to be planked in to facilitate travel
over it. 9 The number of cars switched down this siding was not excessive. 10 The Special Commissioner, to whom this case was referred,
also found that access to plaintiff's property would remain the same
after the proposed track was installed as it had been before." Despite
4 The work was completed between the hours of six p.m. Saturday and eight
a.m. the following Monday: 379 Ill. 494 at 497, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 at 533.
5 Greenlee Foundry Co. v. Limits Industrial Railroad Co., 354 Ill. 11, 187 N.E.
805 (1933).
6 See appellant's brief, p. 7, filed in Greenlee Foundry Co. v. Borin Art Products
Corp., 379 Ill. 494, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 (1942).
7 There are numerous private switch tracks in the vicinity, both on private
property and in public streets. In fact, the plaintiff itself has one such track on
its own property connecting with the Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal
Company line.
8 Fourteenth Street comes to a dead end at the railroad tracks. Forty-seventh
Avenue, the next intersecting street west of the tracks, also comes to a dead
end at Fourteenth Street.
9 The street is sixty-six feet wide at this point. The proposed switch track
would occupy less than thirty-three feet of it, leaving a clear width equivalent
to that of many other streets in the district.
10 At the trial defendant offered to prove that 88 cars had been shunted onto
this track between June 15 and November 21, 1939, when the track was in use.
Each car, it was said, had occupied the track for less than two minutes. See
appellant's brief, p. 17, filed in Greenlee Foundry Co. v. Borin Art Products
Corp., 379 Ill. 494, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 (1942).
11 See findings of fact by special commissioner referred to in appellant's brief,
p. 4, fied in Greenlee Foundry Co. v. Borin Art Products Corp., 379 Ill. 494, 41
N.E. (2d) 532 (1942).
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this, injunction was granted by the trial court and was affirmed on appeal in the instant case. 12
It is a foregone conclusion that members of the general public enjoy
equal rights to travel over public streets. Municipalities have the general power to regulate the use of streets, but they may not authorize
anyone to exclude the public from any portion of a street, nor, in any
1
However,
manner, unreasonably interfere with their legitimate use.
subject to these limitations, travel need not be by any particular mode
of conveyance. 14 On this basis, a general railroad track has frequently
been held to be merely an improved highway and entitled to the use of
Some jurisdictions
public streets concurrently with other travelers.'
have held that a spur or switch track which terminates at a particular
private industry is not a public railroad and is, therefore, not entitled
to the use of public streets. 16
Illinois and some other states, however, have repeatedly held that
such spurs are merely extensions of the railroad itself and, consequently,
are public tracks. 17 It has accordingly been held that, being public,
12 The question of whether plaintiff was the proper party to bring such action
was not discussed in the majority opinion. The dissenting opinion notes that the
court utterly ignored the contention that the validity of an ordinance granting
the use of a public street for a switch track cannot be collaterally questioned by
an adjacent lot owner whose fee is not encroached upon: 379 Ill. 494 at 501, 41
N.E. (2d) 532 at 535. That a proceeding to question its validity can only be
maintained by the city or the people through the proper public official, see Doane
510, 46 N.E. 520, 36 L. R. A. 97 (1897).
v. Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co., 165 Ill.
101, 17 N.E. (2d) 976 (1938);
13 Ginter-Wardein Co. v. City of Alton, 370 Ill.
270, 172 N.E. 829 (1930); Hibbard, Spencer,
Gerstley v. Globe Wernicke Co., 340 Ill.
Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 Ill. 91, 50 N.E. 256, 40 L. R. A. 621 (1898).
Numerous other cases could be cited to the same proposition.
14 Moses v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railroad Co., 21 Il. 515 (1859),
stated, at 522, that: "A street is made for the passage of persons and property;
and the law can not define what exclusive means of transportation and passage
shall be used." This language was quoted with approval in Ligare v. City of
Chicago, 139 Ill. 46 at 63, 28 N.E. 934 at 935 (1891) and approved in several later
cases.
15 While Ligare v. City of Chicago, supra note 14, concedes the general right
of cities to allow railroad tracks in public streets, it denied the attempted exercise of the right therein because the tracks were fenced by a wall which would
have prevented public passage over the tracks. Likewise conceding that general
power, but again denying its application because the railroad was to occupy a
street with numerous switches and tracks, is Chicago Rock Island & Pacific
427, 78 N.E. 790 (1906).
Railway Co. v. People ex rel. Dailey, 222 Ill.
16 44 C. J. 985 states: "The authorities agree that, in the absence of
authorization a grant of the use of streets for a private railway cannot be sustained (citing cases), but they differ as to whether a switch or spur from a public
railroad to a private business establishment is a private railroad within the meaning of the rule, the courts in most jurisdictions so holding it (citing cases from
eleven jurisdictions), although there is authority to the contrary (citing cases
from Illinois, Oklahoma and Ohio)."
17 McQuillan,
Municipal Corporations (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 2d Ed.
1928) Vol. 4, p. 160 says: "In Illinois, a municipality has authority to grant to
private individuals the right to lay switch tracks in a street to connect manu-
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these tracks are subject to regulation by the Illinois Commerce Commission.' 8 Likewise, in this state, any member of the public who wishes
to do so may connect with and use such tracks upon payment of a proportionate share of the cost of construction thereof. 19 The fact that the
track was constructed with funds furnished by the industry to be served
has been held immaterial. 20 Furthermore, the fact that only one industry is so situated that it would wish to connect with a particular track
has not detracted from its public character. 21 These views are aptly
summed up in the following quotation:
"If they (the tracks) are open to the public use indiscriminately, and
under the public control to the extent that railroad tracks generally
are, they are tracks for public use. It may be in such cases that it is expected, or even that it is intended, that such tracks will be used almost
entirely by the manufacturing establishment; yet, if there is no exclusion
of an equal right of use by others, and this singleness of use is simply the
result of location and convenience of access, it cannot affect the question. "22
With the law in this condition, the court cited four cases to support
the proposition that the use in the instant case was a private one. Of
these cases, one involved an overhead bridge connecting two buildings
on opposite sides of an alley and shutting out the light from abutting
facturing plants located on private property with the main track of a railroad
company, on the theory that the track thus permitted is merely an extension of
the track of the railroad company itself, and is, in effect, a grant to the railroad
company to lay its tracks in the street, through the individual presenting the
application." In support thereof the author cites: People ex rel. Rinne v. Blocki,
203 Ill.363, 67 N.E. 809 (1903); McGann v. People ex rel. Coffeen, 194 Ill. 526,
62 N.E. 941 (1902); Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155, 3 N.E. 448
(1885); and Truesdale v. Peoria Grape Sugar Co., 101 Ill. 561 (1882). The cumulative supplement to McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, reveals no further cases
on this point to date. To the same effect is Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) 532.
18 St. Louis, Springfield & Peoria Railroad v. Commerce Commission, 309 Ill.
621, 141 N.E. 405 (1923); The Alton Railroad Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission,
368 Ill.584, 15 N.E. (2d) 508 (1938), affirmed in 305 U. S. 548, 59 S. Ct. 340, 83
L. Ed. 344 (1939).

19 Von Oven v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 317 Ill.
334 at 342,
148 N.E. 32 at 35 (192.5), stated: "This court has held that switch tracks built for
industrial connections with railroads, whether built at the expense of the railroad or the owners of the industry, or at the joint expense of both, become, in
legal contemplation, tracks of the railroad with which they are connected, open
to public use and subject to public regulation."
20 See cases, supra note 18.
21 A distinction has been made where the switch is wholly on private property. In those cases, the track is purely a private use. See: Litchfield & Madison
Railway Co. v. Alton & Southern Railroad, 305 Ill.388, 137 N.E. 248 (1922) and
cases there cited. The very fact that the track is in a public street may, then,
be a basis for treating the track as public.
22 Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155 at 167, 3 N.E. 448 at 453,
quoted with approval in People v. Blocki, 203 Ill.
363, 67 N.E. 809 (1903), and in
St. Louis, Springfield & Peoria Railroad v. Commerce Commission, 309 Ill. 621,
141 N.E. 405 (1923).
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property. 23 Another involved an awning which extended out over a
24
A third involved a concrete
street contrary to a general ordinance.
fill which a gasoline station proposed to locate in a street and which
25
would have cut off the plaintiff from access to the river. The fourth
26
case cited did involve a railroad track in a public street. In that case,
however, the city had allowed a railroad company not only to build a
single track down a street but also to occupy the street with several
tracks, switches, etc., to the practical exclusion of other travelers.
It should be mentioned, also, that the court in the instant case evidently felt itself more or less bound by the previous holding in the condemnation suit.27 No pretense was made that the former case was res
adjudicata, but the court did say that its opinion was largely based on
that decision, 28 and quoted from the earlier case as follows: "The
terminal company could not have condemned the land either of the
foundry company or the pipe works for a track from its railroad to the
10 acres in question for the exclusive use of the owners of the tract, for
such a track would have been a mere spur track of the terminal company for a wholly private use."' 29 This quotation, as the dissenting judge
pointed out,3 0 was based upon the false assumption that this track would
have been used exclusively by the defendants. The line of cases holding
to the contrary were neither mentioned in the earlier opinion nor in the
31
majority opinion in the instant case.
Since the court did cite additional cases purporting to hold that the
use herein involved was a private one, the instant case must be considered as in opposition to the previously established rule in Illinois. It
is unfortunate that the court did not see fit to discuss those cases upon
which grave doubt has now been cast.

I. R.

IcnTsNsTEi

270, 172 N.E. 829 (1930).
Gerstley v. Globe Wernicke Co., 340 Ill.
Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 Ill. 91, 50 N.E. 256,
40 L. R. A. 621 (1898).
25 Ginter-Wardein Co. v. City of Alton, 370 Ill. 101, 17 N.E. (2d) 976 (1938).
427, 78 N.E. 790
26 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. People, 222 Ill.
(1906).
101,
27 Limits Industrial Railroad Co. v. American Spiral Pipe Works, 321 Ill.
151 N.E. 567 (1926). Aside from obvious differences in parties and issues, it was
23
24

not necessary to the decision to hold that this use was a private one. The court
could have contented itself there with merely holding that the railroad was not
a proper person to exercise the power of condemnation. In fact, by far the greater
portion of the opinion was taken up by that holding.
28 In 379 Ill. 494 at 499, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 at 534, it states: "Under all the circumstances, as disclosed by the record, we are of the opinion, based largely
upon the previous holding of this court . . . that the purpose is purely a private
purpose and does not conform to a public use."
29 379 Ill.494 at 496, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 at 533, quoting from 321 Ill. 101 at 106.
151 N.E. 567 at 569.
494 at 499, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 at 534.
30 379 Ill.
31 See such cases, supra notes 16 and 17.
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The Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of Kavanaugh v. Parret'
rendered a decision of practical significance to trial lawyers. In an
action for personal injuries, the plaintiff's counsel in the trial proceed-

ing had asked the jurors collectively on voir dire whether any of them
were agents, employees, representatives, solicitors or policy holders,
or if any were interested financially or otherwise in the insurance company which was defending the case, naming that insurance company.
This question was allowed by the trial court after the plaintiff had filed
with the judge in chambers an affidavit setting forth that defendant
was insured with the company and that the company had agents, representatives and policy holders in the county. The defending insurance
company filed a counter-affidavit to the effect that its policy holders
were not subject to assessment and that none of the jurors, naming
them, were interested financially or otherwise in the insurer. 2 Judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed in the appellate court, but the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the decision on the ground that the foregoing

question was improper under the circumstances.
The problem involved in the case had bothered our courts for some
time, involving on one side the recognized right of counsel in qualifying
jurors to question them as to any interest in the proceeding likely to
prejudice their verdict, and on the other hand the feeling that knowledge
by the jury that an insurance company will suffer the loss, if any, will
prejudice the defendant's case.
It is an accepted and well established rule in this state3 as well as
throughout the country 4 that reference to an insurance company during
the course of the trial is improper, and, if prejudicial, grounds for
reversal. However, where the reference to the insurance company is
made on voir dire, in good faith, and ostensibly to enable plaintiff's
counsel to intelligently exercise his rights of peremptory challenge, and
not merely for the purpose of informing the jury that an insurance
company is defending, the great weight of authority holds that such a
question as that asked in the instant case is proper, unless it can be

shown that prejudice resulted in fact, as by an excessive verdict. 5
1 379 Ill. 273, 40 N.E. (2d) 500 (1942), reversing 310 Ill. App. 429, 34 N.E. (2d)
868 (1941). Farthing, J., wrote a dissenting opinion in which Wilson, J., concurred.
2 The counter-affidavit stated that: ".

.

. the company is not a mutual company

but issued all its policies at a stipulated premium not subject to assessment, that
an examination of the records of the company disclosed that none of the jurors,
naming them, were policy holders, stockholders, agents, employees or in any
way or manner interested financially or otherwise in the affairs of the insurance
company." 379 Ill. 273, at p. 276, 40 N.E. (2d) 500, at p. 502.
3 See Eldorado Coal & Coke Co. v. Swan, 227 Ill. 586, 81 N.E. 691 (1907); McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 232 Ill. 473, 83 N.E. 957 (1908).
4 56 A.L.R. 1418 and cases cited therein.
5 56 A.L.R. 1418, 74 A.L.R. 860, 95 A.L.R. 404, and 105 A.L.R. 1330. See also
comment in 16 CNICAGO-KENT REviEw 371 where the decisions of the various states

on the issue presented have been cataloged.
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Illinois, after a number of somewhat inconsistent decisions, conformed to the majority view by finally adopting it in the case of Smithers
v. Henriquei decided in 1938.6 This case definitely decided that while,
if possible, an examination of the jurors should be conducted so as not to
disclose the existence of an insurance company, a direct inquiry to the
jurors is proper if made in good faith and provided that no apparent
prejudice results. That decision also established the technique to be
used by counsel for the plaintiff in evidencing good faith, to-wit: proof
in chambers by affidavit that there is a strong likelihood of one or more
of the jurors being interested in the insurance company.. Several cases
since decided have followed this view as being the law in Illinois. 7 In
only one subsequent Illinois Supreme Court case prior to the instant
decision, that of Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Company,8
was a similar question held improper, the court, though following the
Smithers decision, holding that the question was not put to the jurors in
good faith, and that its only purpose was to inform the jury of the existence
of insurance.
The only distinguishing feature between the Smithers case, exemplifying the Illinois rule to date, and the instant case is the effect to be
given to the counter-affidavit filed by the insurance company. It is
apparent from the opinion that the case turned on the counter-affidavit,
since the court felt that it showed that the plaintiff's rights to an unprejudiced jury were not in danger. The court said that: "The only
effect of the question was to advise the jury that the insurance company
was making the defense and was liable for the payment of any judgment rendered." 9 When distinguished on this basis the instant case
seems sound. Since the court feels, and the rule has been, that the good
faith of plaintiff's counsel is the determining factor in deciding whether
or not such a question should be permitted of the jurors, it follows that
the question should not be allowed where the insurance company can
establish positively that none of the jurors can be prejudiced, since in
the latter situation the only purpose that would be served by putting
such a question to the jurors would be to inform them of the insurance
company's interest in the case.
It would seem then that the instant case is not a reversal of the
prior rule laid down in the Smithers case, but results really in the
recognition of a new device to be used by the defending insurance
company whereby it can keep such a question from the jury. The use
of such counter-affidavits is, of course, not unprecedented. It was tried
6 368 Ill. 588, 15 N.E. (2d) 499 (1938). For a review of the earlier decisions in
Illinois on this point see comment in 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 371.
7 Bellchambers v. Ebeling, 294 Ill. App. 247, 13 N.E. (2d) 804 (1938); Verna v.
Moffat, 295 Ill.
App. 624, 15 N.E. (2d) 62 (1938); LaRocco v. Antonello, 300 Ill.
App. 608, 21 N.E. (2d) 26 (1939); and O'Neal v. Caffarello, 303 Ill.
App. 574, 25
N. E. (2d) 534 (1940).
8 378 Ill.
180, 37 N.E. (2d) 801 (1941).
9 379 Ill.
273, at p. 277, 40 N.E. (2d) 500, at p. 502.
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at least once in Illinois in a case decided in 1940,10 but in that case the
appellate court decided the issue squarely on the rule laid down in the
Smithers case, either disregarding the counter-affidavit, or feeling it
insufficient to negative the plaintiff's good faith.
In the instant case the counter-affidavit was positive in that it had been
based on a search of the insurance company's books, and not merely
upon information and belief of the counsel for the insurance company.
The court, being satisfied that none of the jurors was interested in the
insurance company, could say that plaintiff, even in good faith, had no
need to ask the question. Though the Supreme Court has in no way
reversed itself, it has, in effect, sanctioned a device which may result
in a complete reversal of technique used by practicing attorneys in personal injury cases. Such attorneys will now hesitate to ask this type of
question, and, if faced with a counter-affidavit in proper form, will
have to forego the right to examine the jurors in regard to their possible
interest in the defending insurance company."
As the law now stands, good faith of the plaintiff's counsel is the
starting point for determining the admissibility of such a question. Such
good faith is evidenced by the use of an affidavit or affidavits. Counteraffidavits furnished by the defendant may challenge either the good
faith of the plaintiff or demonstrate the lack of necessity for such a line
of questioning. Upon presentation thereof, a hearing before the judge
in chambers becomes essential. Yet, no matter how positive the counteraffidavit may be, and even though it be based on an examination of the
records of the insurance company, it does not exclude the possibility
that one or more of the prospective jurors might have an interest in
the company substantial enough to prejudice him though such interest
might not appear on the records. 12 A decision on so important a question from the mere inspection of affidavits in chambers is, to say the
least, an unsatisfactory treatment of the problem.
J. HoNoRorF
10 O'Neal v. Caffarello, 303 Ill. App. 574, 25 N.E. (2d) 534 (1940).
11 It is interesting to note that the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District,
came to the same conclusion, in a case with similar facts and where a similar
counter-affidavit was filed, in a decision subsequent to but not relying on the
instant case. See Handley v. Erb, 314 Il. App. 207, 41 N.E. (2d) 222 (1942).
12 He might, for example, be the holder of an unrecorded transfer of shares
in the company, or be related to one financially interested in its affairs.

